The Universal & Atomic Elements of Organization
A falsifiable scientific theory proposing that the same irreducible structures organize both thought and reality — from the quantum to the social scale.
O-Theory proposes that four irreducible structures — Distinctions, Systems, Relationships and Perspectives (DSRP) — form the universal grammar of organization. Rather than being merely useful ways of thinking, these structures are hypothesized to be the atomic elements from which every organized phenomenon emerges, whether in cognition, biology, physics, mathematics, society, or the cosmos.
| D | S | R | P |
| Distinctions | Systems | Relationships | Perspectives |
| Identity ↔ Other | Part ↔ Whole | Action ↔ Reaction | Point ↔ View |
| D := (i ↔ o) | S := (p ↔ w) | R := (a ↔ r) | P := (ṗ ↔ v) |
This is a living scientific evidence compendium: an open, continually evolving collection of independent empirical research, formal theory, mathematical proofs, cross-disciplinary analyses, applications, critiques, and proposed falsifications. Every entry is included because it supports, refines, challenges, or attempts to falsify the theory.
Scientific theories are strengthened not only by evidence that confirms their predictions, but also by surviving attempts to falsify them. This compendium brings both together: independent evidence from researchers who were not testing DSRP and counterexample candidates evaluated against the formal theory.
One counterexample is enough to falsify O-Theory. Until then, the question remains: do the same four structures organize everything from quantum systems to human thought?
Independent convergence is one of the strongest forms of scientific evidence because researchers arrive at the same conclusion while investigating different questions for different reasons.
The number is not the point. Researchers in different fields, studying different questions with different methods, repeatedly arrived at the same structural predictions—almost always without testing DSRP or using its language.
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This compendium began as the peer-reviewed literature review “A Literature Review of the Universal and Atomic Elements of Complex Cognition,” published in the Journal of Systems Thinking with 109 studies. That paper is the peer-reviewed foundation. What you see here is its living, continuously updated version . New studies are checked before they are added, and the collection now holds and keeps growing. Open any card to see what the researchers found, why it bears on DSRP, and where the original review discusses it, the fuller account.
The collection is updated continuously, so the citation carries the date you consulted it rather than a study count — the count changes weekly, and putting it in the reference would make the same collection look like a different work to everyone who cites it. To cite a single claim or study, use its own address: every one has a permanent link.
This is the adversarial half of the compendium. Where the evidence track asks what converges on DSRP, this one asks what would end it: a single organized phenomenon whose structure needs a fifth pattern, a ninth element, or a fifth structural dynamic. It holds written up from candidates across territories, and corollaries — the general answers those cases settle against. Every case is published whether it held or failed, including the ones still open.
Cite this rather than the evidence collection when the point is what survived attack. The two are separate works with separate addresses: one asks what converges on the theory, the other asks what would end it, and a reference to the first does not support a claim about the second. Case and resolution numbers change when the record is revised, so cite a case by its own permanent link rather than by number.
This collection is meant to keep growing. Send us a study, paper, book or critique that bears on DSRP, whether it supports the theory or cuts against it, and we will read it and decide whether it belongs.
Removing the Boundaries Between Mind, Matter, and Spacetime
Authors Michael Silberstein, William Stuckey
Year 2020
Publisher National Library of Medicine
Kind of work article
Discipline Philosophy
Secondary disciplines Physics, Cognitive Science
Reading level technical
Applied false
Read it at the publisher 10.3390/e22050551
Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein's sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.
To give a principle explanation of the relationship between conscious experience and physics starting from neutral monism rather than from physics, and to sketch a derivation of key features of relativity and quantum mechanics from two axioms grounded in that neutral monism.
No empirical sample. The analysis covers special and general relativity, Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, and worked cases including length contraction and time dilation, Bell spin-state entanglement, the delayed choice quantum eraser, and Wigner's friend.
Philosophical argument combined with a formal sketch. The authors characterize a variant of James's and Russell's neutral monism, state two axioms (Axiom 1: interacting bodily objects coextensive with space and time form the context of all self-consistent shared perceptual information, and these perceptions constitute different reference frames; Axiom 2: no observer's perceptions provide a privileged perspective, the principle of no preferred reference frame), and show how the postulates of special relativity, quantum gauge invariance, symmetries and the Bell-state correlations follow from them as adynamical global constraints, interpreted through their Relational Blockworld account of quantum mechanics.
The authors conclude that the two axioms yield the postulates of special relativity, and with them Lorentz transformations, time dilation, length contraction and the relativity of simultaneity, because every observer measures the same value of c. Applied to the quantum of action h, the same no-preferred-reference-frame principle yields the Bell spin-state correlations: Alice and Bob each find that the other's outcomes conserve spin angular momentum only on average, which the authors argue shows quantum mechanics is complete and coherent with special relativity rather than nonlocal or in need of hidden variables. They argue that the experienced cut between inner mental experience and the outer physical world is not absolute, that the difference between subjectivity and the objective world is perspectival only, and that the same constraints rule out any disagreement between conscious experience and quantum predictions in cases such as the delayed choice quantum eraser. They conclude that property dualism and a preference for dynamical, causal explanation produce both the hard problem of consciousness and the puzzles of quantum foundations.
Silberstein and Stuckey argue that mind and matter are not two kinds of thing but one kind of event seen from different positions. From two axioms, the central one being that no observer's view of the world is privileged, they sketch how much of relativity and quantum mechanics follows, including the puzzling correlations of quantum entanglement.
The paper sets out to replace the two dominant starting points for relating consciousness to physics, strong emergence and panpsychism, with a third: the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell, in which the basic stuff is neither mental nor physical but neutral events of experience. The authors argue that Galileo's split between primary and secondary qualities, and a habit of preferring dynamical, causal-mechanical explanation, produced both the hard problem of consciousness and the unresolved puzzles of quantum foundations. Their alternative is principle explanation in Einstein's sense, in which constraints that hold globally over spacetime do the explaining. They state two axioms. The first says interacting objects in space and time form the context of all self-consistent perceptual information shared between perceiving observers, and that these perceptions make up different reference frames. The second says no observer's perceptions give a privileged view of the physical world, the principle of no preferred reference frame. They then argue that classical physics and quantum gauge invariance satisfy the first axiom as divergence-free conservation, that symmetries express the second, and that the two together give the postulates of special relativity. A worked example with two groups moving at 0.6c shows each group correctly saying the other's rulers are short and clocks slow, a disagreement settled by the relativity of simultaneity. The same reasoning applied to spin measurements on Bell states gives conservation of spin angular momentum that holds only on average, because each observer must measure the same quantum of action; on this reading entanglement is no more mysterious than time dilation and does not show quantum mechanics to be incomplete. The authors also outline an approach to quantum gravity, and they treat the delayed choice quantum eraser with an added conscious agent who tries to beat the quantum statistics, arguing that the global constraints guarantee the agent's choices fit the predictions without any strange forces. They close by naming the intuitions their view gives up: property dualism, a Newtonian picture of time, reductionism, and the priority of causal explanation.
Two DSRP patterns carry weight in this paper. The clearest is Perspectives. The authors' second axiom, that no observer's view is privileged, does most of the explanatory work: it produces relativity, accounts for the entanglement correlations, and grounds their claim that subjectivity and the objective world differ only in perspective. Their worked examples are explicitly about the same events described differently from different reference frames, each frame valid. The second is Distinctions. The paper's subtitle is about removing boundaries, and its argument is that the mind-matter and inner-outer distinctions are real in experience but not absolute: the authors describe an experienced cut between internal mental experience and the external world where none exists absolutely. That is a claim about how a boundary depends on vantage, which is where D and P meet. Systems and Relationships are present in the physics, through nested theories, interacting objects and conservation, but the authors explicitly reject causal and dynamical relations as fundamental, so recording R would cut against their own framing. Several caveats apply. The work is a formal sketch resting on metaphysical axioms the authors choose, not a test, so it bears on the theory as formalism rather than as evidence that the structure exists in nature. Reference frame in physics is a narrower notion than perspective in DSRP, and the match should not be read as identity. The neutral monist ontology itself is contested, and DSRP does not depend on it.
Patterns it shows D, S, R, P
Formal proof or model
Added 2026-11-22
How to cite this Michael Silberstein, William Stuckey (2020). Re-Thinking the World with Neutral Monism: Removing the Boundaries Between Mind, Matter, and Spacetime: Removing the Boundaries Between Mind, Matter, and Spacetime. National Library of Medicine.