Living Evidence Compendium

The Universal & Atomic Elements of Organization

A falsifiable scientific theory proposing that the same irreducible structures organize both thought and reality — from the quantum to the social scale.

What if the same structures that organize your thoughts also organize the world? Explore the hypothesis

O-Theory proposes that four irreducible structures — Distinctions, Systems, Relationships and Perspectives (DSRP) — form the universal grammar of organization. Rather than being merely useful ways of thinking, these structures are hypothesized to be the atomic elements from which every organized phenomenon emerges, whether in cognition, biology, physics, mathematics, society, or the cosmos.

DS RP
DistinctionsSystemsRelationshipsPerspectives
Identity ↔ OtherPart ↔ Whole Action ↔ ReactionPoint ↔ View
D := (i ↔ o)S := (p ↔ w) R := (a ↔ r)P := (ṗ ↔ v)

This is a living scientific evidence compendium: an open, continually evolving collection of independent empirical research, formal theory, mathematical proofs, cross-disciplinary analyses, applications, critiques, and proposed falsifications. Every entry is included because it supports, refines, challenges, or attempts to falsify the theory.

Scientific theories are strengthened not only by evidence that confirms their predictions, but also by surviving attempts to falsify them. This compendium brings both together: independent evidence from researchers who were not testing DSRP and counterexample candidates evaluated against the formal theory.

One counterexample is enough to falsify O-Theory. Until then, the question remains: do the same four structures organize everything from quantum systems to human thought?

Try a demonstration yourself Why is this convergent evidence compelling? See why independent convergence is one of science’s strongest forms of evidence.

independent opportunities for the theory to fail.

Independent convergence is one of the strongest forms of scientific evidence because researchers arrive at the same conclusion while investigating different questions for different reasons.

The number is not the point. Researchers in different fields, studying different questions with different methods, repeatedly arrived at the same structural predictions—almost always without testing DSRP or using its language.

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About this collection

This compendium began as the peer-reviewed literature review “A Literature Review of the Universal and Atomic Elements of Complex Cognition,” published in the Journal of Systems Thinking with 109 studies. That paper is the peer-reviewed foundation. What you see here is its living, continuously updated version . New studies are checked before they are added, and the collection now holds and keeps growing. Open any card to see what the researchers found, why it bears on DSRP, and where the original review discusses it, the fuller account.

Cabrera, D., Cabrera, L., & Cabrera, E. A Literature Review of the Universal and Atomic Elements of Complex Cognition. Journal of Systems Thinking. · Cornell University & Cabrera Research Lab.

How to cite this collection

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The collection is updated continuously, so the citation carries the date you consulted it rather than a study count — the count changes weekly, and putting it in the reference would make the same collection look like a different work to everyone who cites it. To cite a single claim or study, use its own address: every one has a permanent link.

About this record

This is the adversarial half of the compendium. Where the evidence track asks what converges on DSRP, this one asks what would end it: a single organized phenomenon whose structure needs a fifth pattern, a ninth element, or a fifth structural dynamic. It holds written up from candidates across territories, and corollaries — the general answers those cases settle against. Every case is published whether it held or failed, including the ones still open.

How to cite the counterexample candidates and corollaries

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BibTeX

Cite this rather than the evidence collection when the point is what survived attack. The two are separate works with separate addresses: one asks what converges on the theory, the other asks what would end it, and a reference to the first does not support a claim about the second. Case and resolution numbers change when the record is revised, so cite a case by its own permanent link rather than by number.

Know of work that belongs here?

This collection is meant to keep growing. Send us a study, paper, book or critique that bears on DSRP, whether it supports the theory or cuts against it, and we will read it and decide whether it belongs.

 

DSRP Evidence

Moons are planets: Scientific usefulness versus cultural teleology in the taxonomy of planetary science

Details

Authors Metzger, Philip T. and Grundy, W.M. and Sykes, Mark V. and Stern, Alan and Bell III, James F. and Detelich, Charlene E. and Runyon, Kirby and Summers, Michael

Year 2022

Publisher Icarus

Kind of work article

Discipline Astronomy

Secondary disciplines History, Philosophy

Applied false

Read it at the publisher 10.1016/j.icarus.2021.114768

In authors' words

What they set out to do (purpose)

To argue, from the history of the term, that moons belong in the class "planet" and that planetary taxonomy should rest on scientific usefulness rather than inherited cultural concepts.

Who or what was studied (sample)

Historical record of how the term planet was used from the Copernican period through the 1920s and after, and the 2006 IAU definition.

How they did it (methods)

Historical and conceptual analysis of classification criteria.

What they found (results)

The authors find that from the Copernican era through the 1920s planets were defined by intrinsic physical traits, with moons counted as planets and primary versus secondary status a lower subdivision. They trace the orbit-based boundary to a nineteenth-century folk taxonomy and argue that it has no scientific basis, that the 2006 IAU definition mixes dynamical and intrinsic criteria, and that classes should align with explanatory theory such as geological complexity.

Commentary

In short

A historical and conceptual study arguing that the category "planet" should be drawn by what bodies are like, not what they orbit, so that moons count as planets.

Response

The argument is about where the boundary of a category falls and what criterion draws it (D), with primary and secondary bodies nested as subclasses inside a larger class (S). The authors also state that taxonomy is theory-laden and purpose-driven and contrast scientific and cultural vantage points (P). Relationships are only weakly present (tidal effects are discussed and set aside as a class boundary). The paper is a position paper, so the evidence is conceptual and the authors' own preference is part of the claim. Only the first 100,000 characters of the text were read.

Patterns it shows D, S, P

Shows the structure is there

Added 2026-11-08

How to cite this Metzger, Philip T. and Grundy, W.M. and Sykes, Mark V. and Stern, Alan and Bell III, James F. and Detelich, Charlene E. and Runyon, Kirby and Summers, Michael (2022). Moons are planets: Scientific usefulness versus cultural teleology in the taxonomy of planetary science. Icarus.