[DSRP Evidence](https://dsrpevidence.org/)

# Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

## Details

**Authors** Putnam, Robert D.

**Year** 1988

**Publisher** International Organization

**Kind of work** article

**Discipline** Political Science

**Secondary disciplines** Public Policy

**Applied** false

[Read it at the publisher](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027697) 
10.1017/s0020818300027697

## In authors' words

### Abstract

Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly "state-centric" theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of "two-level games" may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.

### What they set out to do (purpose)

To account for the linkages between domestic politics and international relations, which state-centric theories do not adequately explain, by offering a theory of how international agreements are ratified.

### How they did it (methods)

A theoretical article. It builds the two-level game model and illustrates it with cases including Western economic summits, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, and the European Community.

### What they found (results)

The author argues that when a leader must win ratification from constituents, negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous demands of a domestic game and an international game. The theory covers domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic institutions, negotiators' strategies and tactics, uncertainty, domestic reverberation of international pressure, and the chief negotiator's own interests.

## Commentary

### In short

This article argues that international bargaining is played at two tables at once, one between governments and one inside each country. A leader's moves at either table are constrained by what the other will accept.

### Response

The model nests one arena of bargaining inside another (system) and makes the influence running between the two arenas its central subject (relationship). The negotiator who sits at both tables also sees the same agreement from two positions, which touches on viewpoint, but the abstract does not make that the claim, so it is not recorded. The article is a theory illustrated by cases and does not report a test. The record rests on the Crossref abstract, not the full text.

**Patterns it shows** S, R

Formal proof or model

**Added** 2026-11-11

**How to cite this** Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization.
