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# The Protection of Information in Computer Systems

## Details

**Authors** Saltzer, J. H. and Schroeder, M. D.

**Year** 1975

**Publisher** Proceedings of the IEEE

**Kind of work** article

**Discipline** Cybersecurity

**Secondary disciplines** Computer Science & AI

**Applied** false

[Read it at the publisher](https://doi.org/10.1109/proc.1975.9939) 
10.1109/proc.1975.9939

## In authors' words

### Abstract

This tutorial paper explores the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification. It concentrates on those architectural structures--whether hardware or software--that are necessary to support information protection. The paper develops in three main sections. Section I describes desired functions, design principles, and examples of elementary protection and authentication mechanisms. Any reader familiar with computers should find the first section to be reasonably accessible. Section II requires some familiarity with descriptor-based computer architecture. It examines in depth the principles of modern protection architectures and the relation between capability systems and access control list systems, and ends with a brief analysis of protected subsystems and protected objects. The reader who is dismayed by either the prerequisites or the level of detail in the second section may wish to skip to Section III, which reviews the state of the art and current research projects and provides suggestions for further reading.

### What they set out to do (purpose)

To explain how computer-stored information is protected from unauthorized use or modification, concentrating on the architectural structures, in hardware or software, that protection requires.

### Who or what was studied (sample)

A conceptual tutorial without an empirical sample. Examples come from systems of the period, including Multics, CTSS, TENEX, ADEPT and UNIX.

### How they did it (methods)

A tutorial in three sections: basic principles, descriptor-based protection systems, and a review of the state of the art. Section I builds a sequence of models: users isolated in virtual machines, controlled sharing through descriptors, and list-oriented and ticket-oriented authorization.

### What they found (results)

The authors classify protection schemes by function into unprotected systems, all-or-nothing isolation, controlled sharing, user-programmed sharing controls, and putting strings on information. They model protection as an impenetrable wall around each separately protected object, with a door and a guard that checks authority. A principal is the entity accountable for a virtual processor's actions, and the set of objects a principal may use is its domain. Complete isolation is a degenerate case of both list-oriented and ticket-oriented sharing. Because no one knows how to build a flawless system, they offer eight design principles: economy of mechanism, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least privilege, least common mechanism, and psychological acceptability. They describe these as warnings, not absolute rules.

## Commentary

### In short

Saltzer and Schroeder lay out how computer systems keep information from unauthorized use: dividing information into protected objects, checking every access, and following a short list of design principles that limit the damage of flaws.

### Response

The paper's model of protection rests on the Distinction pattern (a wall and guard separating what is inside from what is outside, and authorized access from unauthorized access, across a range of functional levels from unprotected to controlled sharing). It also rests on the Systems pattern (information divided into mutually exclusive partitions, and protected subsystems encapsulated in domains of their own) and on the Relationships pattern (authorization linking principals to objects, in list-oriented and ticket-oriented forms). Caveats: this is an engineering tutorial in which the structures are design choices, not features found in nature; it reports no empirical test; and the Perspective pattern is not clearly present, though the idea that one user may act under different principals is arguably related and is not claimed here.

**Patterns it shows** D, S, R

Formal proof or model

**Added** 2026-11-17

**How to cite this** Saltzer, J. H. and Schroeder, M. D. (1975). The Protection of Information in Computer Systems. Proceedings of the IEEE.
