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# Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm

## Details

**Authors** Hart, Oliver and Moore, John

**Year** 1990

**Publisher** Journal of Political Economy

**Kind of work** article

**Discipline** Economics

**Secondary disciplines** Law & Jurisprudence, Business & Management

**Applied** false

[Read it at the publisher](https://doi.org/10.1086/261729) 
10.1086/261729

## In authors' words

### What they set out to do (purpose)

To provide a framework for deciding when a transaction should be carried out within a firm and when through the market.

### Who or what was studied (sample)

Theoretical analysis; no empirical sample.

### How they did it (methods)

A formal model in which a firm is identified with the assets its owners control, and ownership confers residual rights of control over those assets. The authors compare integration with nonintegration and study how changes in ownership affect incentives.

### What they found (results)

The authors argue that the key difference between owning a firm and contracting with its owner is the buyer's power over the people involved. Under integration, the buyer can selectively dismiss the firm's workers, including the party who would otherwise own the firm. Under nonintegration, the buyer can only stop dealing with the firm as a whole, meaning its owner, workers and assets together. They use this contrast to show how changes in ownership alter the incentives of employees and of owner-managers. They also note that the framework covers other control structures, such as partnerships and worker and consumer cooperatives, as special cases.

## Commentary

### In short

A model of when a transaction belongs inside a firm rather than in the market. It places the difference in who can dismiss whom: an owner can fire individual workers, while an outside buyer can only stop dealing with the firm as a whole.

### Response

The paper draws a boundary between inside and outside the firm (distinctions), which is its central object. It defines the firm as a whole made of assets and the people who work them, and it contrasts acting on the parts (firing individual workers) with acting only on the whole (ending dealings with the entire firm) (systems). It then traces how changing who controls which assets changes the incentives of the people involved (relationships). The fit is strongest for distinctions. Perspectives is the weakest fit and is not claimed: the model gives the two parties different positions, but the authors do not treat viewpoint itself as a variable. The conclusions follow from the authors' assumptions about control rights and are not tested against data in this paper.

**Patterns it shows** D, S, R

Formal proof or model

**Added** 2026-11-17

**How to cite this** Hart, Oliver and Moore, John (1990). Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy.
